Introduction
The e¤ect of neutral technology shocks on hours worked has received much attention in macroeconomics. For instance, the seminal paper by Galí (1999) estimates a negative response of hours after a positive shock to total factor productivity by means of a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model identi…ed through a longrun restriction. The latter can be justi…ed in a large class of business cycle models (including both Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian (NK) models). That empirical result questions the relevance of technology shocks as the main driving force of aggregate ‡uctuations, for in the data hours worked is pro-cyclical. Nominal rigidities (in the form of sticky prices and/or sticky wages as in Galí 1999) or real rigidities (in the form of habit persistence and capital adjustment costs as in Francis and Ramey 2005) can explain that empirical evidence in the context of modern DSGE models.
1 Canova et al. (2010 and 2012) have re…ned the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables by allowing adjustment along both the intensive margin (i.e., hours worked) and the extensive margin (i.e., employment). Using an SVAR model identi…ed through long-run restrictions as in Fisher (2006) , they arrive at the following estimation result. Labor input contracts along both margins in the aftermath of a positive neutral technology shock, and the largest share of that adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. They also investigate the e¤ects of investment-speci…c technology shocks and …nd that they have an expansionary e¤ect on total hours. In this case, however, the corresponding adjustment results predominantly from changes along the intensive margin.
The present paper shows that the empirical evidence described above can be explained within a New Keynesian set-up with labor market frictions. In fact, the proposed model has only two additional features with respect to the standard textbook New Keynesian model: capital accumulation, since we are interested in analyzing 1 For an overview of that literature, see Galí and Rabanal (2005) . dynamic consequences of investment-speci…c shocks, and labor market frictions with two margins of adjustment, since we want to study the split across the two margins.
Our theoretical explanation for the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks is novel and surprisingly simple. Employment relationships are costly to establish in our model. The extensive margin of labor adjustment to an economic shock is therefore quantitatively important, if the shock makes a long-term investment worthwhile.
But this is the case for a persistent shock to total factor productivity. On the other hand, an expansionary investment-speci…c technology shock incentivizes …rms to use the more ‡exible hours margin to adjust to the shock. The reason is that …rms can only take advantage of this shock by investing. But additional investment demand in the economy creates a short-run extra need for labor input, which makes it optimal for …rms to use predominantly the more ‡exible hours margin in their adjustment to the shock.
Let us relate our results to those in the literature. Sveen and Weinke (2009) have analyzed the role of labor adjustment at both the intensive and the extensive margin for in ‡ation dynamics in the aftermath of monetary policy shocks. In the present paper we extend that framework to make it suitable for an analysis of our new research questions. As explained in the previous paragraph, those questions regard the dynamic consequences of technological shocks. Our results point at an interesting alternative to the theoretical mechanism proposed by Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) . Those authors have developed a business cycle model with labor market frictions, in the context of which neutral technological progress prompts waves of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Their analysis o¤ers an interesting theoretical explanation of the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables. Compared with their work our explanation combines, however, features which are standard in the DSGE models which are nowadays routinely used by researchers inside and outside the academic world to analyze a wide range of issues related to business cycle ‡uctuations. Another strand of the recent literature integrates labor market frictions into fully- ‡edged medium-scale DSGE models that are suitable for model estimation (see, e.g., Christiano et al. 2016 ).
Our focus is more speci…c. We use a relatively simple model to illustrate how a small set of assumptions that are standard in the DSGE literature helps explain the dynamic consequences of alternative technological shocks for labor market variables of interest. Our paper therefore conducts a positive analysis and this di¤erentiates it from the recent contributions with a normative focus (see, e.g., Galí 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses our results and section 4 concludes.
The Model
Our New Keynesian model features labor market frictions and two margins of labor adjustment as in Sveen and Weinke (2009) . In addition, we allow for endogenous capital accumulation subject to a convex capital adjustment cost. In what follows we analyze the optimal choices on the part of households and …rms, and we close our model be specifying a conventional form of monetary policy. Appendix A states the dynamic stochastic system of equations that are used in our quantitative analysis.
Households
There is a continuum of households and each of them consists of a large number of family members. There is assumed to be full consumption risk sharing within each household.
2 Each period some family members are unemployed while others work for …rms. Each member has the following period utility function
where parameter denotes the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, and parameter is a scaling parameter to be used in the calibration of our model. H t denotes hours worked in period t, and C t is consumption of the aggregate good.
The household is assumed to maximize the average utility of its members subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form
where P t is the price index, I t is investment of the aggregate good, and D t denotes riskless one-period nominal bonds with the associated gross nominal interest rate 
where Z I;t is the level of investment-speci…c technology, and function ( ) measures the capital adjustment cost. It is assumed that ( ) = , 0 ( ) = 1, and 00 ( ) = 1 , with parameter denoting the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to marginal Q, evaluated in steady state. Parameter is the rate of capital depreciation.
The consumer Euler equation implied by this structure takes the following standard form
where t;t+1
is the real stochastic discount factor. Moreover, we get an optimality condition for capital accumulation
where Q t 1 Z I;t 0 I t K t , the marginal Q, measures in equilibrium the period t expected discounted real value of having an additional unit of capital in period t + 1.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competetive …rms, indexed on the unit interval. Each …rm i has access to the following technology
where N t (i) is the number of employees in …rm i, and H t (i) indicates hours worked by each employee, while K t (i) is the amount capital used in production. Last, Z t is the level of neutral technology. We assume constant returns to scale and a capital share of 2 [0; 1].
Cost minimization on the part of households and …rms implies that demand for good i is given by
where
1 is the aggregate good, and parameter is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of goods Y t (i). Let us also note that the associated price index is
The law of motion of employment is given by
where V t (i) is the number of vacancies posted by …rm i in period t, and parameter s denotes the separation rate. We have also used the de…nition (V t =U t ) ! (V t =U t ) , with V t denoting aggregate vacancies, and U t 1 (1 s) N t 1 are household members looking for jobs at the beginning of period t. Parameter indicates the matching elasticity, and ! is a measure of the e¢ ciency of the matching technology. We assume the following labor adjustment cost
with G (1) = G 0 (1) = 0, and G 00 (1) = n , where parameter n is the laboradjustment cost in the log-linear approximation. Moreover there is a cost cZ t Z 1 I;t of posting a vacancy, where parameter c is a constant that is used in the calibration. Both costs are measured in units of the aggregate good. Finally, the Calvo restriction on price adjustment states that each period a lottery takes place and with probability (1 ) a …rm gets to re-optimize its price, whereas with probability the …rm posts its last period's price. Since households are assumed to be the ultimate owners of the …rms in the economy, …rms use the stochastic discount factor to discount future pro…ts. A …rm's problem therefore reads
P t+k (i) with prob.
:
The …rst order condition for price-setting is standard
is of the form
which re ‡ects that …rms take rationally into account that with wage bargaining a marginal increase in hours worked per worker increases the real wage. At the margin, the cost of using hours worked and rented capital must be the same, which implies
Combining the …rst-order conditions for employment and vacancy posting implies
where t
can be interpreted as the real cost of hiring one additional worker. Equation (13) re ‡ects the fact that hiring is a forward-looking decision.
The left hand side gives the marginal cost of integrating one additional worker into the workforce. It consists of the associated hiring cost, the cost of adjusting the workforce, and the wage income. The right hand side gives the marginal bene…t from having an additional worker: the cost savings resulting from having a larger workforce, and the continuation value. The latter consists of future savings in hiring costs, as well as changes in the future cost of adjusting the workforce. The level of employment is a …rm-speci…c state variable in our model. We therefore use the method in Woodford (2005) to compute the coe¢ cient pre-multiplying the average real marginal cost in the in ‡ation equation. The details are given in Appendix B.
Market clearing implies that aggregate output reads
while value added, GDP t , is de…ned as
Wage Negotiation
The wage negotiation takes the form considered in Sveen and Weinke (2009) . Specifically, we follow Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) and assume that newly hired workers become productive instantaneously. The period value of a match (with …rm i) for a worker, expressed in consumption units,
is the job-…nding probability, and e U t is the value of being unemployed after hiring has taken place. It is given by
is the unemployment bene…t, and the value of the average
The period value of the match for a worker consist of the associated real wage income taking into account the utility cost of working expressed in consumption units. In addition, the match gives a continuation value for the worker. With probability (1 s) the worker will still work at …rm i in period t + 1, and in case the worker separates from …rm i, she can …nd a job at another …rm (with probability F t+1 ). Otherwise, she will receive the unemployment bene…t.
The value of being unemployed (after hiring has taken place) can be interpreted in an analogous way. In period t the worker receives an unemployment bene…t, and in addition she obtains a continuation value.
The value of a match for …rms corresponds to the cost of hiring a worker
The reason is that newly hired workers become productive instantaneously so that a …rm can hire another worker if negotiations break down. Nash wage bargaining implies the …rst-order condition
where (1 ) denotes the weight of workers in the bargain. This implies that all household members who work receive the same value from a match, irrespective of which …rm a household member works for. This is, again, a consequence of instantaneous hiring.
Combining (15) and (16), we arrive at the following expression for the gain from working compared to being unemployed
Hence any wage di¤erences across …rms result from di¤erences in hours worked only. In fact, the real wage income compensates for the disutility derived from hours worked (expressed in consumption units), since the gain from working is equal across all …rms. We can use (17) and (19) to substitute for e J t and f W t e U t in equation (18). This implies
Finally, using equation (20), it can be seen that …rm i's real marginal cost satis…es
This shows that the bargained wage is privately e¢ cient, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure relative to labor productivity is relevant for the determination of …rm i's real marginal cost.
Monetary policy
We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule of the form
where R is meant to indicate the degree of interest rate smoothing, and parameter measures the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in in ‡ation.
Exogenous shocks
The exogenous processes t and Z t measure the respective levels of investmentspeci…c and neutral technology. They are described by stationary autoregressive processes of the form
with , Z 2 (0; 1) and " ;t , " Z;t denoting the respective innovations in those processes. In order to be consistent with the identifying assumptions in the VARs estimated by Canova et al. (2010 and 2012) we would need to consider permanent technological shocks. It is well understood, however, that monetary DSGE models featuring permanent technological shocks need to combine a wide variety of nominal and real rigidities in order to imply an empirically plausible in ‡ation response to those shocks (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters 2007) . Our goal in the present paper is more limited. We wish to isolate the economic mechanisms through which technological shocks can a¤ect labor market variables, and we therefore stick to a relatively simple model featuring transitory technological shocks.
Calibration
We consider a quarterly model. In our quantitative analysis the following values are assigned to the model parameters. This implies a steady-state mark-up of about 20 per cent. Our baseline value for the Calvo parameter, , is 0:75, i.e., …rms change their prices on average once a year. As far as monetary policy is concerned, we set = 1:5 and r = 0:95. The labor supply elasticity, 1= , takes the value 0:3. The matching function elasticity, , is set to 0:6. The separation rate, s, is assumed to take the value 0:1, and the unemployment bene…t, B, is set to 40% of steady state real labor income. The labor adjustment cost, n , takes the value 2, and the bargaining power parameter, , equals 0:5. We impose that hours worked in steady state correspond to 1=3 of available time. Period unemployment is set to 0:06, and we let the quarterly job…lling rate be 0:7. This is achieved by an appropriate choice of parameters , !, . Finally, we assume = Z = 0:9, a setting associated with persistent technological processes.
Results
Our main result regards the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks under consideration. This is illustrated in …gures 1 and 2. They show, respectively, the dynamic response of several macro variables to a one standard-deviation shock to neutral and investment-speci…c technology. The rate of in ‡ation is annualized. All other variables are measured as the respective log deviation of the original variable from its steady state value.
[ Fig 1 and 2 about here]
As illustrated in …gure 1, hours decrease in response to a positive neutral technology shock. That result accords with the evidence in Galí (1999) . Most importantly, the fact that adjustment occurs primarily along the extensive margin is in line with the empirical results in Canova et al. (2010 Canova et al. ( , 2012 . In a way consistent with standard results in the New Keynesian literature (see, e.g., Galí 2015, pp. 72) et al. (2010, 2012) . In fact, conditional on an investment-speci…c technology shock our model predicts that the adjustment occurs predominantly through the intensive margin of labor adjustment. A key aspect of that shock is that …rms can only take advantage of it by investing. This explains why investment, output, in ‡ation and the real wage all increase in the aftermath of an investment-speci…c technology shock.
The intuition behind the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks under consideration is straightforward. Employment relationships are costly to establish in our model. The extensive margin of labor adjustment to an economic shock is therefore quantitatively important, if the shock makes a long-term adjustment worthwhile.
It is instructive to compare those economic mechanisms to the ones proposed by Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) . In their model technological shocks can prompt wawes of Schumpeterian destruction. The idea is that technological progress can make old jobs obsolete. In the short-run, employment can therefore decrease in response to a positive technological shock. The extent to which this occurs depends on various other aspects of the model. In particular, the degree of labor market frictions is important for the quantitative relevance of relocations between obsolete and technologically advanced jobs. Moreover, the extent to which investment is needed to bring about technological improvement of existing jobs matters for the short-run employment response to a technological shock. The reason is that the increase in the marginal utility of consumption (associated with an increase in investment) increases the value of an existing job, for any given level of technology. The authors show that in response to a positive neutral technology shock employment decreases, whereas it increases in response to an investment-speci…c technology shock. This is an interesting theoretical explanation of the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables. The present paper o¤ers, however, an alternative economic mechanism to explain those empirical regularities, and it is fair to say that compared with Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) our explanation combines features which are standard in the DSGE models that are nowadays routinely used by researchers inside and outside the academic world to analyze a wide range of issues related to business cycle ‡uctuations. In particular, the economic mechanism analyzed in this paper relies on demand-constrained …rms setting prices in a staggered fashion. The reason is that labor adjustment to technological shocks along both margins will only be conducted according to the incentives analyzed above, if a …rm has a limited ability to a¤ect demand over the planning horizon for a long-term employment decision. In fact, to the extent that prices are fully ‡exible, labor market variables react very little to technological shocks. This is illustrated in …gures 3 and 4.
[ Reiter (2008) and Pissarides (2009) . 4 They show that, in the context of RBC models, search frictions generally cannot explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment 4 Pissarides (2009) coined the term "unemployment volatility puzzle". His main focus is the role of wage stickiness à la Hall (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) in that context. He also observes: " Costain and Reiter (2008) noted, in a paper that anticipated to some extent both the Shimer [2005] critique and the Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) response, that if nonmarket returns are high, the response of unemployment to labor-market policy, in particular unemployment insurance, is too large." (and vacancies) in response to neutral technological shocks. Also in the case of a positive investment-speci…c technology shock, illustrated in …gure 3, the response of the labor market variables is relatively muted compared with the corresponding outcome in the baseline version of our model. This is in line with some of the …nd-ings in Sveen and Weinke (2008) . They point at the importance of demand shocks in accounting for labor market dynamics. The quantitative importance of those shocks is, however, enhanced by price stickiness, as analyzed there. A related point regards the role of monetary policy. More concretely, by fully stabilizing the price level, monetary policy can replicate the ‡exible price equilibrium allocation in the context of our baseline sticky price model. This is a standard result, which is often referred to as divine coincidence (see, e.g., Galí 2015, pp. 103) . By increasing the size of policy parameter , i.e., the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in in ‡ation, the central bank can approximate that outcome in our model.
Conclusion
Starting with a seminal contribution by Galí (1999) , the e¤ect of technological shocks on hours worked has received much attention in macroeconomics. In particular, Canova et al. (2010 and 2012) have estimated the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables by allowing adjustment along both the intensive margin (i.e., hours worked) and the extensive margin (i.e., employment). Using an SVAR model identi…ed through long-run restrictions as in Fisher (2006) , they estimate the dynamic consequences of both investment-speci…c and neutral technology shocks. Interestingly, they …nd that the two margins of labor adjustment are used to a very di¤erent extent depending on the nature of the technological shock under consideration. More concretely, labor input contracts along both margins in the aftermath of a positive neutral technology shock, and the largest share of that adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. By way of contrast, investmentspeci…c technology shocks have an expansionary e¤ect, which results predominantly from adjustments along the intensive margin.
The present paper shows that the empirical evidence described above can be explained in the context of a New Keynesian model featuring endogenous capital accumulation combined with labor market frictions. We therefore o¤er an alternative to the Schumpeterian economic mechanism developed in Michelacci and LopezSalido (2007) . This is interesting, we believe, because our explanation combines features which are standard in the DSGE models that are nowadays routinely used by researchers inside and outside the academic world to analyze a wide range of issues related to business cycle ‡uctuations. Ultimately, structural econometric work will be needed in order to assess the relative quantitative relevance of those (and potentially other) economic mechanisms. This is an avenue of our future research.
Appendix A: Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
In what follows we consider a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics around a zero in ‡ation steady state. Unless stated otherwise lower case letters denote the log-deviation of the original variable from its steady state value. The consumption Euler equation reads
where parameter denotes the household's time preference rate and rr t r t E t t+1
is the real interest rate. Up to the …rst order aggregate production is given by
Linearizing and aggregating the law of motion of capital gives
and the …rst-order conditions associated with investment and capital can be loglinearized as
where the following relationship holds true
Aggregating the linearized law of motion of …rm-level employment results in
where we have used the notation that a variable without a time subscript denotes the steady state value of that variable. Linearized search unemployment reads
Period unemployment is given by
Aggregating and linearizing the …rst order condition for …rm-level employment im-
where is the di¤erence operator and
The following relationships holds true
The real wage is given by
and
The real marginal cost reads
The following in ‡ation equation is derived
where parameter is computed numerically using the method outlined in Woodford (2005) . Market clearing implies
and value added reads
Last, monetary policy is given by
Appendix B: Computational Algorithm
We posit rules for price-setting and for employment
denote, respectively, …rm i's relative price and its relative to average employment. We have also used the de…nitions b P t (i)
, where P t is the average newly set price.
Let us …rst impose stability. Invoking the pricing and employment rules, as well as the de…nition of the price index we obtain The average newly set price reads
Solving the last equation forward and invoking the linearized price index gives
where ( This pins down the coe¢ cients ( 1 ; 2 ; 1 ). 
